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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(3 )(j), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Wests present the following issues as error in their appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in not granting an additur for general damages, 
or in the alternative a new trial on general damages, where the plaintiffs each were awarded 
a substantial amount of special damages, but only one dollar in general damages. The 
standard of review on appeal for failure to award an additur or grant a new trial is generally 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 803-04 (Utah 1991). However, if "as a preliminary matter prior 
to the ultimate determination of the motion, the judge relies on legal principles which are 
erroneous or facts which are wholly without record support, this may also constitute grounds 
for reversal." Id. at 805 n. 19. 
Preservation of the Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Additur or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict filed on September 20, 2001, R. 465; in Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to 
Defendant Holley's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Additur, or in the 
Alternative, for a New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict filed on November 
21, 2001. and in oral argument on December 4, 2001, R. 636:3-8. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by not granting an additur, or in the alternative 
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a new trial on damages, for the jury's failure to include special and general damages related 
to Mr. West's spinal cord stimulator where there was no testimony or evidence to contradict 
Mr. West's three expert physicians stating the spinal cord stimulator was damaged in the 
collision. Again, the standard of review on appeal of this issue is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 803-
04 (Utah 1991). 
Preservation of the Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Additur or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict filed on September 20, 2001, R. 465; in Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to 
Defendant Holley's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Additur, or in the 
Alternative, for a New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict filed on November 
21, 2001, and in oral argument on December 4, 2001, R. 636:8-10. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to conduct a more thorough 
examination of juror Weinmuller regarding her alleged misconduct and biases. The standard 
of review on appeal is set forth in State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f43, 992 P.2d 951: "As 
a general rule, trial judges have some discretion in limiting voir dire inquiry.... However, 
the trial judge's discretion narrows to the extent that questions do have some possible ink 
to possible bias, and when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an 
actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such inquiries." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Preservation of the Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved with the trial 
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court in oral argument on December 12, 2001. R. 637:12-13. 
4. Whether the trial court erred by finding Ms. WeinmullerVbias against persons 
who have made worker's compensation claims and personal injury claims did not provide 
sufficient basis for a challenge for cause. The standard of review for trial court's 
determination of whether to excuse a juror for cause is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. Jenkins v. Parrislu 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1931). "We view the trial court's 
exercise of discretion, however, 'in light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any 
problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another.'" State v. 
Wash, 2001 UT 35, ^ [25 (quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536). 
Preservation of the Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Additur or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict filed on September 20, 2001, R. 465; in Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to 
Defendant Holley's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Additur, or in the 
Alternative, for a New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict filed on November 
21, 2001, and more particularly in oral argument on December 12, 2001, R. 637:14. 
5. Whether the trial court erred upon finding Ms. Weinmuller failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire, that Plaintiffs would have used an early 
peremptory challenge to strike her from the panel had she provided honest answers during 
voir dire, and that Ms. Weinmuller held feelings and biases prejudicial to the plaintiffs, but 
made the legal conclusion that only bias sufficient to warrant a challenge for cause can result 
in a new trial. The trial court's determination was based on its interpretation of law, which 
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is accorded no particular deference on appeal but is instead reviewed for correctness. See, 
e.g., State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Preservation of the Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Additur or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict filed on September 20, 2001, Pv. 465; in Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to 
Defendant Holley's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Additur, or in the 
Alternative, for a New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict filed on November 
21, 2001, and in oral argument on December 12. 2001, R. 637:14-15. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309. 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2. 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below 
Plaintiffs Stephen and Holley West filed a complaint against Defendant Jeffery 
Holley on August 25,2000, for injuries they sustained arising out of an automobile collision 
on January 7, 2000. R. 3. A jury trial was held on August 14 through 16 and August 21, 
2001. R. 638,643-45. Thejuryretumedaverdictfmding Holley 95% at fault and Mr. West 
5% at fault, awarded Mr. West $8,040 in special damages and $1 in general damages, R. 
434, and awarded Mrs. West 53,000 in special damages and SI in general damages, R. 432. 
The Wests filed a Motion for Additur or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial or 
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judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on September 20, 2001. R. 448. After hearing oral 
arguments on the Wests' motion, the trial court entered a memorandum decision dated 
December 7, 2001 denying the Wests' motion for an additur, but ruled a post trial hearing 
should be held regarding alleged juror misconduct. R. 591-96. Such hearing was held on 
December 12, 2001, after which the Court denied the remaining portions of the Wests' 
motion. R. 598:18-21. An Order prepared by Holley denying the Wests' motion was signed 
by the trial court on February 26, 2002. R. 621. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Mr. and Mrs. West were involved in an automobile collision on January 7,2000 with 
Holley. R. 3. Mr. West was driving, and Mrs. West was in the front passenger's seat of 
their family vehicle. R. 638:54-55. The Wests brought suit for injuries and damages 
sustained in the collision. Mrs. West complained of pain in her shoulders and neck, 
headaches, low back pain, and tingling in her legs immediately following the collision. R. 
645:16-17. Mr. West also complained of neck pain, back pain, shoulder pain, and headaches 
immediately after the collision. R. 638:74, 139. 
In addition, Mr. West complained of damage to his spinal cord stimulator, which had 
been implanted prior to the collision. Mr. West had previously been diagnosed with chronic 
regional pain syndrome ("CRPS") that caused left and right leg pain. R. 638:93. This pain 
began when Mr. West sustained a severe left knee injury in 1992 when he was seventeen 
years old while working at Ralph's Grocery Store in California. R. 638:76-77. This injury 
led to a California claim for worker's compensation benefits wherein Mr. West received a 
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lifetime medical award. R. 638:81-82. Mr. West experienced severe pain following 
multiple surgeries, and was finally toid by his physicians in California no remedy was 
available for him. R. 638:83-85. 
This pain continued for years until Mr. West was diagnosed with CRPS, R. 638:93, 
and a spinal cord stimulator was surgically implanted in February of 1999, R. 638:106-10. 
While the stimulator did not cure Mr. West's problem, when the stimulator was turned on 
a stimulus which wTas directed to Mr. West's spinal cord masked his pain, providing 
excellent relief. Id. Although the stimulator required periodic adjustments, R. 639:30-32, 
35-36, Mr. West's results were excellent, and he was able to accomplish many things 
previously impossible, such as complete a full semester of school at a university without 
academic withdrawals. R. 638:113. 
As Mr. West was advised by physicians not to drive with the stimulator activated, 
the stimulator was off at the time of the collision. R. 639:37. Because he was worried about 
turning the stimulator on with his low back injury, Mr. West did not attempted to activate 
the stimulator until the next day following the collision. Id. As soon as it was activated, Mr. 
West immediately noticed he was not receiving the proper stimulus to his lower extremities, 
but instead received stimulus in the area of his abdomen to mid thigh. R. 639:37-38. 
At trial, Mrs. West presented evidence of medical treatment she received for her 
injuries, including chiropractic care, R. 638:175-81, 645:17, and claimed medical expenses 
totaling $5,125.00, Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 20. Mrs. West's symptoms improved through her 
care; however, she did not completely heal and testified she continued to experience 
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migraine headaches at least once per month. R. 645:25. 
Mr. West also presented evidence of medical treatment received for both his neck and 
back injuries, including chiropractic care, and for treatment related to changes he 
experienced with his spinal cord stimulator and related CRPS symptoms. Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 1; R. 639:3%-passim. With respect to Mr. West's spinal injuries, he received 
chiropractic treatment and experienced marked improvement of his neck and back pain, R. 
639:49-50; however, he continued to suffer occasional neck and back pain, and migraine 
headaches two to three times per week. R. 639:63-64. Mr. West claimed $10,170.00 in 
medical expenses more directly related to his spinal injuries and initial treatment. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. 10. 
With respect to Mr. West's spinal cord stimulator, shortly after the collision he sought 
treatment from Richard Rosenthal, M.D., who had most recently monitored Mr. West's 
CRPS and associated spinal cord stimulator. R. 639:36-40. Mr. West contacted Dr. 
Rosenthal numerous times over the next few weeks, both regarding changes in his stimulator 
and regarding a report Mr. West needed for ongoing issues with his worker's compensation 
claim in California. R. 639:41. Dr. Rosenthal ultimately refused to write the report Mr. 
West repeatedly requested, and also refused to give Mr. West further care. R. 639:43-44. 
Mr. West then withdrew from school and moved to Idaho, unable to complete his classes 
due to pain associated with his CRPS symptoms that was no longer being alleviated by his 
spinal cord stimulator. R. 644:120-23:639:10-11. 
Upon moving to Idaho, Mr. West sought treatment for his CRPS pain and spinal cord 
7 
stimulator from Dr. James K. Moriand, M.D.. and Timothy J. Johans, M.D. R. 639:44-45: 
Defendant's Exhibit No.l. These physicians examined Mr. West, reviewed x-rays of his 
stimulator, took additional x-rays, and both concluded the leads for the stimulator device had 
shifted. Defendant's Exhibit No. 1; see Addendum 1. Both physicians also stated in their 
medical records (which were admitted into evidence, R. 643:158) their opinion that the leads 
shifted as a direct result from the collision with Holley. See Addendum 1. On January 10, 
2001, Mr. West had a surgical re-implantation of the spinal cord stimulator. Defendant's 
Exhibit No.l. After this re-implantation, Mr. West experienced the same relief from the 
stimulator that he experienced prior to the collision. R. 644:112. Mr. West claimed special 
damages of $10,088.81 related to his spinal cord stimulator, Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 10, and 
additionally claimed lost wages and lost tuition, R. 639:24-26, 645:8. 
In addition to the medical records of doctors Morland and Johans, Mr. West also 
provided in court testimony from Lynn Wright Webster, M.D., a physician who specializes 
in pain medicine, to testify regarding Mr. West's stimulator and CRPS symptoms. R. 
643:l5$-passirn. Dr. Webster reviewed and explained Mr. West's medical records, R. 
643:165-85, and generally explained spinal cord stimulators and their need for periodic 
adjustments. R. 643:173-76,188. Dr. Webster also testified regarding the relative ease with 
which the leads in a stimulator can migrate, including from any daily activity. R. 643:197, 
202-01. However, Dr. Webster testified in his opinion the migration of Mr. West's 
stimulator leads was most likely caused by the collision. R. 643:188-89; 203, 212-13, 218. 
In response to the Wests' evidence regarding their injuries, Holley presented 
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testimony from Gerald Moress. M.D. P.. 644:24. Dr. Moress testified Mrs. West suffered 
chronic soft tissue strain of the neck with no objective symptomology, R. 644:31-32. and 
Mr. West suffered chronic spine strain, R. 644:53. Dr. Moress also testified regarding Mr. 
West's CRPS diagnosis before the collision, disagreeing with the diagnosis based on the 
medical records. R. 644:42. However, Dr. Moress further testified Mr. West's diagnosis 
was irrelevant, that Mr. West had chronic pain, and that the stimulator was needed. R. 
644:106. Upon the West's motion, Dr. Moress was found unqualified and was precluded 
from testifying regarding the reasonableness of the Wests' chiropractic care, R. 643:156, and 
was also found unqualified and was precluded from testifying regarding the likelihood that 
the spinal cord stimulator leads moved in the collision, R. 644:20. 
Holley provided further testimony of accident reconstructionist Ron Probert, who 
concluded the forces of the collision on the Wests were somewhere between three to four 
miles per hour, R. 639:119, and eight to nine miles per hour, R. 639:129. Holley later 
presented testimony from David Ingebretsen, a bio-mechanical engineer, who testified the 
Wests' complaints of "transient neck soreness" were consistent with the collision, but any 
complaints of long term chronic injuries were inconsistent with the dynamics of the 
collision. R. 645:108. Holley attempted to introduce Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony regarding 
the likelihood that the leads migrated in the collision, R. 659:149-56, but the trial court 
found Mr. Ingebretsen was unqualified to so testify and such testimony was precluded by 
the trial court, R. 639:156-57. Consequently, Holley provided no testimony to refute or 
rebut Mr. West's evidence from Dr. Webster, Dr. Johans, and Dr. Morland that the 
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stimulator was damaged in the collision. 
Before deliberations, the jury was instructed regarding damages, which included, 
inter alia, the following language regarding nominal damages: 
If you find, for instance, that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict in 
accordance with these instructions, but you do not find that the evidence 
before is sufficient to show that the Plaintiffs have sustained any substantial 
damages, then you may return a verdict for the Plaintiffs on one or more of the 
theories of liability and fix the amount of general damages in a nominal sum, 
such as SI.00. 
R. 399 (emphasis added); see Addendum 2. 
To make clear whether the jury awarded medical expenses for Mr. West's spinal cord 
stimulator re-implantation and associated treatment, the special verdict fomi asked what 
special damages incurred in Idaho, where nearly all of Mr. West's treatment for re-
implantation of the stimulator occurred. R. 434. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. 
West finding Holley 95% negligent. Id. The jury awarded $8,040.00 in medical expenses 
for spine related injuries, id., which award is not challenged on appeal. However, the jury 
did not award special damages for treatment incurred in Idaho, id., which finding is on 
appeal before the Supreme Court. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. West for 
$3,000.00 in special damages for spine-related treatment, R. 432, and this award is not 
challenged on appeal. Finally, with respect to Mr. and Mrs. West's general damages, the 
jury awarded $0. R. 432, 434. 
Upon reviewing the verdict forms, the court instructed the jury that, because the jury 
had found there were damages, they were required to award "some general damage." The 
jury then promptly returned a verdict of SI.00 in general damages for both Mr. and Mrs. 
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West. R. 596. Upon the Wests' request, the jury was polled, revealing the jury's verdict 
with respect to Mr. West's special damages was agreed upon by only six of the eight jurors, 
R. 645:271, and Mr. West's general damages verdict and all of Mrs. West's verdict was 
agreed upon by seven jurors, R. 645:272-75. 
After the verdict was entered, Plaintiffs filed a motion for Additur or in the alternative 
Motion for a New Trial or Judgment notwithstanding the verdict on September 20, 2001. 
R. 448. Mr. and Mrs. West moved for an Additur under Rule 59(a)(5) and (6), arguing that 
the jury's award of $8,040 for Mr. West and $3,000 for Mrs. West, concurrent with an 
award of $1.00 in general damages, was inherently inconsistent, contrary to Utah law, and 
contrary to the jury's instruction that nominal damages could only be awarded if the jury 
found the Plaintiffs did not suffer "any substantial damages." R. 458-59. Mr. West 
specifically moved for a new trial regarding damages related to his spinal cord stimulator 
under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing since Mr. West's expert 
witness testimony and medical records evidence was uncontradicted, there is insufficient 
evidence to justify the verdict of failing to award damages related to his spinal cord 
stimulator. R. 455-58. 
Finally, both Mr. and Mrs. West moved for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based on the misconduct of Juror Susan Weinmuller. R. 450-
55. In support of this motion, Mr. and Mrs. West presented the affidavit of Juror Stacey 
Bercie, who stated Ms. Weinmuller repeatedly spoke with other jurors regarding evidence 
that had recently been presented to the jury following recesses, prior to the jury retiring to 
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deliberation; thai she intended to discuss the case with her husband and her daughter, a 
police officer, before the jury had returned a verdict; that Ms. Weinmuller stated she had 
been the subject of several claims or suits against her for personal injuries as a private 
business owner which were not disclosed during voir dire; and that Ms. Weinmuller 
expressed very strong feelings and opinions against awarding general damages. R. 468. 
With respect to voir dire, all potential jurors were asked whether they or a close 
family member had been involved in a civil lawsuit "as a plaintiff or defendant or witness." 
R. 643:53. Many jurors responded affirmatively, but Ms. Weinmuller did not. R. 643:53-
60. The trial court further asked whether any potential juror had any strong feelings against 
brining lawsuits, R. 643:60, whether anyone held strong negative feelings about lawyers and 
clients who seek compensation for personal injury, R. 643:61, whether anyone felt incapable 
of awarding money for pain and suffering, R. 643:80, and whether there was anything that 
had not been disclosed which would prevent the potential juror from fairly considering the 
case, R. 643:82. Many jurors responded throughout these questions, voicing pro-defendant 
bias, R. 643:61, and (mostly) pro-plaintiff bias, R. 643:57, 59, 66-67. Ms. Weinmuller, 
however, did not respond to these questions, although she did respond to others. R. 643:34, 
76. Based on Ms. Bercie's affidavit, the Wests moved for a new trial for Ms. Weinmuller's 
misconduct and failure to disclose pertinent information during voir dire. R. 450-55. 
After hearing oral arguments on Mr. and Mrs. West's motion, the trial court entered 
a memorandum decision dated December 7. 2001 denying the Plaintiffs Motion for an 
Additur based on the nominal verdict of SI.00 in general damages. R. 596. In support of 
12 
its holding, the court staled that Mr. West's testimony primarily focused on pain and 
suffering related to CRPS. R. 595. The court did not offer any reasoning for denying Mrs. 
West's motion. Id. The trial court also denied Mr. West's motion for a new trial on the 
issue of damages related to CRPS and Mr. West's spinal cord stimulator, reasoning the jury 
may have concluded these damages may have occurred from Mr. West's chiropractic care. 
R. 594-95. However, the court found there was sufficient evidence to warrant holding a post 
trial hearing to question Ms. Weinmuller regarding her potential misconduct. R. 592-94. 
Such hearing was held on December 12,2001. R. 598. At this hearing, both counsel 
presented proposed voir dire questions for Ms. Weinmuller. R. 601, 604. The trial court 
stated it quickly reviewed the proposed voir dire, but the court instead asked its own 
questions. R. 637:5-12; see Addendum 3. Ms. Weinmuller admitted she failed to answer 
the trial court's question inquiring whether any members of the panel had ever been 
involved in a lawsuit as a Plaintiff defendant or witness. R. 637:5-6. Weinmuller disclosed 
that she and her husband had been sued as business owners of a closely held business by a 
salesman, and also had multiple claims made against her by employees seeking worker's 
compensation benefits. R. 637:6-8. 
When the trial court asked if Ms. Weinmuller was left with any negative feeling 
toward the courts or resolving disputes in court, Ms. Weinmuller responded by referencing 
these claims of employees "who got injured other places than our place of employment." 
R. 637:7-8. When asked the same question again, she stated: "Well, it taught me a good 
lesson in life. It taught me about people. And it's really not a negative feeling, not a 
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disgruntled feeling about people, just that I'm very leery of people. I can feel when a sham 
is being presented to me and I can discern." R. 637-9. 
When the court asked Ms. Weinmuller whether, notwithstanding her prior 
experiences in California, she judged Mr. and Mrs. West's case based on its own facts and 
on the law and circumstances presented, Ms. Weinmuller responded, "I would have qualified 
myself, definitely, because I've had that happen to me throughout the years. If s happened 
many times, you know, being an employer." R. 637:9. The court then asked: "Did you 
consider this case on its own merits? Or did you consider what happened to you in 
California?" R. 637:10. Ms. Weinmuller responded: "No. I looked at this man. My feeling 
about him were this was a sixteen year old boy that got injured in the knee, and for 10 years 
he was bilking the Ralph's grocery company. He comes here and he has a fender bender. 
And he's accustomed to receiving easy money and he wrants to do the same thing again. He 
had lawsuits here, in Idaho, and he was going back to California with one. And so I looked 
at him and thought this is a young man that likes to bilk the system." Id. 
With respect to misconduct, the trial court only referenced its instructions to not 
discuss the case among themselves or with anyone else over the weekend brake in the trial, 
and asked Ms. Weinmuller whether she followed that instruction, whereupon Ms. 
Weinmuller responded she did. R.637:10-l 1. The trial court also asked Ms. Weinumller 
if she discussed the case with her husband or daughter, saying "you and I both know [she] 
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is a police officer."1 R. 637:11. Ms. Weinmuller stated her daughter was out of town, and 
that she did not speak with her husband. Id Finally, after counsel for the Wests urged the 
court to inquire further regarding Ms. Weinmuller's biases, the court asked the following 
question: "I think my question was-at that time what I would have said was can you set 
aside whatever experiences you have had in California as an employer and these workman 
compensation suits and the suit with the disgruntled salesperson, set that entire experience 
aside and judge this case based on its own facts and its own merits?" R. 637: 11. Ms. 
Weinmuller answered "Definitely." Id. 
Counsel for Mr. and Mrs. West then asked the court to inquire regarding Ms. 
Weinmuller's biases against awarding general damages, and the court declined to do so. R. 
637:12. Counsel for the Wests then made a record that he did not believe the court asked 
sufficient questions to probe Ms. Weinmuller's feelings regarding worker's compensation 
claims and her biases against the people who had made such claims; that the court failed to 
address her alleged biases regarding general damages; that the court failed to ask more 
probing questions regarding her misconduct as alleged by juror Stacie Bersie; and made a 
record of the court's refusal to use proposed voir dire questions. R. 637:12-13 
The trial court then found Ms. Weinmuller's representation that she did not discuss 
the trial with family members was satisfactory, and no further inquiry was warranted. R: 
during voir dire, the trial court acknowledged he knew and regarded highly Ms. 
Weinmuller's daughter "Ingrid," a police officer. R. 643: 34. Ms. Weinmuller later 
stated she had "two police officers." R. 643:76. Ms. Weinmuller's response to the trial 
court's questioning leaves open whether she discussed the case with her other "police 
officer" family member, as suggested in Ms. Bersie's affidavit. R. 468. 
15 
637:18. Second, the court found Ms. Weinmulier made a falsehood or misstatement of fact 
during voir dire. Id. More specifically, the court found Ms. Weinmulier had strong feelings 
about worker's compensation claims in California, and ''that was a situation that factually 
and directly related to this case without question." R.637:19. 
The trial court then expressed uncertainty regarding this Court's plurality decision in 
State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992), and whether the trial court must find the omitted 
answers would have created or supplied a basis to challenge a juror for cause in order to 
grant a new trial, or whether a loss of a peremptory challenge is sufficient. R. 637:18-21. 
The trial court concluded Thomas requires the juror must have failed to disclose information 
that would have provided a basis to challenge the juror for cause, and found Ms. 
Weinmuller's affirmative answer that she would have set aside her experiences and judged 
this case on its own merits would have defeated a challenge for cause. R. 637:19-20. 
However, the trial court expressly found: "Plainly, this is a circumstance where she 
would have been an early preemptory [sic] challenge. So what I'm leaving on the record is 
I'm finding that Counsel would have had a strong basis and reason to exercise a preemptory 
[sic] challenge, but that the evidence and the response would not have risen to a challenge 
for cause. R. 637:20. The trial court then denied the Wests' motion for a new trial. R. 
637:21. 
After the Wests' filed a Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement, Holley filed a 
Motion for Summary Disposition on May 1,2002. This Court entered an Order on October 
25, 2002 deferring ruling on Holley's motion and ordering the parties to proceed with the 
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appellate process. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court should have granted the Wests' motion for an additur for general 
damages related to the Wests' spinal injuries. To award special damages of $8,040 for Mr. 
West and S3,000 for Mrs. West, the jury must, as a matter of law. have found the Wests had 
pain and injuries related to the collision to warrant such an awrard. The Wests therefore 
necessarily also suffered general damages for pain and suffering, making the verdict's 
nominal damages award inherently inconsistent. Moreover, the nominal damages verdict 
is against Utah law. Nominal damages verdicts in Utah have been allowed in circumstances 
where Plaintiffs have failed to prove any compensatory damages. This cannot be so on the 
undisputed facts of this case, since the jury found the Wests reasonably incurred substantial 
special damages for treatment of their injuries. Hence, under these undisputed facts the 
Wests respectfully submit they are entitled, as a matter of law, to general damages for their 
spine-related injuries. 
The trial court also should have granted Mr. West's motion for an additur, or in the 
alternative a new trial on damages, for the verdict's failure to include special and general 
damages related to Mr. West's spinal cord stimulator. Mr. West presented evidence from 
three physicians who opined the spinal cord stimulator was damaged in the collision. After 
marshaling all the evidence, Mr. West can find no competent evidence to rebut or contradict 
this testimony. Because Holley failed to rebut this evidence, the trial court should have 
entered an additur or in the alternative a new trial on damages on this issue. 
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The Wests also submit the trial court erred by refusing to conduct a more through 
examination of Juror Susan Weinmuller regarding her alleged misconduct and biases. Ms. 
Weinmuller disclosed information that revealed an actual bias. Notwithstanding the trial 
court's findings that Ms. Weinmuller's strong feelings and biases were directly related to 
this litigation, the trial court refused to allow further questioning regarding her other 
opinions related to the litigation process. Moreover, in light of the trial court's findings that 
Ms. Weinmuller failed to honestly answer material voir dire questions, the trial court should 
have allowed further questioning regarding Ms. Weinmuller's alleged misconduct as averred 
by another juror, in spite of Ms. Weinmuller's declarations that she followed the trial court's 
two instructions mentioned at the post trial hearing. 
Notwithstanding the court's limited questioning, Ms. Weinmuller revealed substantial 
bias against Mr. and Mrs. West which provided a sufficient basis for a challenge for cause, 
and the trial court should be reversed for failing to make such finding. The trial did find that 
the first prong of the test this Court set forth in State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992), 
was satisfied; namely that Ms. Weinmuller failed to honestly answer a material question on 
voir dire, but found the second prong was not satisfied. Although Ms. Weinmuller made 
repeated comments revealing her prior experiences with the California worker's 
compensation system strongly biased her view of Mr. West, the trial court found Ms. 
Weinmuller's biases did not rise to the level of providing a sufficient basis to challenge her 
for cause. The Wests submit Ms. Weinmuller clearly revealed a tendency for prejudice and 
bias, and therefore should have been stricken for cause. 
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Finally, the trial court erred by making the legal conclusion that only biases sufficient 
to warrant a challenge for cause can result in an a new trial under this Court's decision in 
Thomas. The trial court made findings undisputed on appeal that Ms. Weinmuller had 
strong, negative feelings on an issue that was "factually and directly related'" to this case: 
namely, Mr. West's prior worker's compensation related injuries that were claimed by Mr. 
West to have been aggravated in the collision. R. 637:19-20. The trial court then found Ms. 
Weinmuller's biases presented "a circumstance where she would have been an early 
preemptory [sic] challenge." Id. Since this juror sat on the jury, and clearly was partial, the 
trial court should have ordered a new trial under this court's holding in State v. Evans, 2001 
UT22,f29;20P.3d888. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The General Damages Award Is Inconsistent with 
the Special Damages Award and Is Against Utah Law 
The Wests' first issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in not granting 
an additur for general damages, or in the alternative a new trial on general damages, where 
the Wests each were awarded a substantial amount of special damages, but only SI.00 in 
general damages. 
This Court has held the standard of review on appeal for failure to awTard an additur 
or grant a new trial is generally whether the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 803-04 (Utah 1991); Child v. Gonda, 
972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998): Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122,126 
(Utah 1997). However, if "as a preliminary matter prior to the ultimate determination of the 
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motion, the judge relies on legal principles which are erroneous or facts which are wholly 
without record support, this may also constitute grounds for reversal." Crookson, 817 P.2d 
at 805 n. 19. 
The Wests submit this first issue before the Court falls in the ambit of a question of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ 26,20 P.3d 
888 (conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, while decisions not to grant a new trial 
are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard). Stated differently, the Wests submit 
under the undisputed facts of this case, they are entitled to an additur for spine related injures 
or new trial as a matter of law. 
Nevertheless, consonant with their duty to "marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding," Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), the Wests note the following from the 
record regarding their claim for general damages related to their spinal injuries. Dr. Moress 
testified Mrs. West suffered from a "chronic soft tissue strain of the neck," R. 644: 31, and 
also stated he could find no objective symptoms, R. 644:32. Dr. Moress further testified he 
would have ordered physical therapy (rather than chiropractic care) for Mrs. West three 
times a week for three or four weeks at $ 100.00 per visit. R. 644:38. Regarding Mr. West, 
Dr. Moress testified he suffered chronic soft tissue sprain of his spine, R. 644:53, and stated 
he would have ordered the same type of treatment for Mr. West as Mrs. West, although he 
would have first tried home remedies, R. 644:53-54. Although Mr. West suffered from 
intermittent neck and back pain, R. 639:63, Mr. West also testified he experienced periods 
of time with no neck or back pain, R. 644: 111. 
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The record also reveals Mrs. West's subjective complaints on her chiropractic record 
frequently listed her pain in some areas of her body at two out of ten, with ten being the 
worst pain, while other areas were listed higher. R. 638:38-40. Mrs. West also appeared at 
trial to have said in her deposition testimony she suffered from less headaches than were 
stated at trial. R. 645:40-41. Finally, Mr. Ingebretsen testified the Wests' complaints of 
"transient neck soreness" were consistent with the collision, but any complaints of long term 
chronic injuries were inconsistent with the dynamics of the collision. R. 645:108. 
While the above evidence tends to contradict the severity of the Wests' spine related 
injuries, Holley's own experts admit the Wests suffered injuries. Accordingly under the 
undisputed facts and findings of the jury, the Wests were entitled to an additur or new trial 
under Rule 59 as a matter of law. The jury instruction given in the present case stated the 
jury could award nominal damages if the jury were to find the Plaintiffs did not suffer "any 
substantial damages." R. 399. This Court has defined "nominal damages" as "wa trivial sum 
such as one cent or one dollar awarded to a Plaintiff whose legal right has been invaded but 
who has failed to prove any compensatory damages.'" Foote v. Clark 962 P.2d 52,51 (Utah 
1998) (quoting Gould v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 6 Utah 2d 187,189-90, 309 P.2d 
802 (1957)) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the jury awarded Mrs. West S3.000 out of $5,125 claimed in 
special damages. Mr. West was awarded $8,040 out of $ 10,170 in special damages claimed 
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for spine related injuries.2 In order to award the Wests money damages for medical 
treatment, the jury must, as a matter of law, have found the Wests had pain and injuries 
related to the automobile collision. The Wests cannot, therefore, be said to have failed to 
prove "any compensatory damages, " Foote, 962 P.2d at 57, nor can it be said the Wests 
failed to prove "any substantial damages" as required by the jury instructions, R. 399. 
Consequently, the jury's later award of $1 nominal damages for pain and suffering is both 
inconsistent and contrary to Utah law. The trial court therefore erred by not granting the 
Wests an additur or new trial on the issue of general damages for spinal injures under Rule 
59(a)(5) and (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
These facts cannot reasonably be disputed on appeal. As a preliminary matter to 
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award and additur or 
in the alternative a new trial, the trial court's legal conclusion of wrhether this verdict is 
inherently inconsistent and against Utah law must be examined. Crookston, 8 17 P.2d at 805 
n. 19. This question of law is "one on which an appellate court owes no deference to a trial 
court's determination:' State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Holley has alleged in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition ("Memorandum in Support"') that the West's 
special damages awarded by the jury were insubstantial. Memorandum in Support at 9. 
However, the Utah legislature has already determined what amount of special damages in 
2The remaining 510,088.81 in medical expenses, lost wages, and tuition expenses 
claimed at the time of trial were related to Mr. West's spinal cord stimulator and CRPS 
injuries, which is irrelevant to this issue on appeal. 
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Utah is considered toe insubstantial as to merit a general damages award for pam and 
suffering. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. Utah's no-fault threshold statute, has statutorih 
prohibited general damages awards in smaller tort claims arising out of automobile 
collisions, which otherwise could have been situations where nominal damages verdicts 
might be justified for plaintiffs who have showed a legal right has been invaded, but have 
failed to prove compensatory damages. See Utah Code Ann § 31A-22-309(l)(a) (Supp. 
2001); Warren v. Melville, 937P. 2d 556,563 (UtahCt. App. 1997) (holding Utah's no-fault 
statues reasonably prohibit general damages claims for "less serious personal injuries"). 
Accordingly, by statute, both Mr. and Mrs. West have substantial special damages which 
entitle them to claim general damages, having met the $3,000 threshold limit.3 See Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a)(v) (Supp. 2001). 
This issue appears to be one of first impression in Utah. However, in Langton v. 
International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971), this Court upheld refusal to grant 
a new trial where the jury awarded $868.25 in special damages but no general damages, 
since the plaintiff failed to object to the defective verdict of zero (as opposed to nominal) 
damages. Id, at 1213. In dictum, the Court held: "[I]t must be conceded that if plaintiff 
were entitled to an award of special damages, he was entitled to be compensated, under the 
evidence, for pain and suffering . . . ." Id. at 1214 (emphasis added). 
'In fact, prior to deliberations the trial court found as a matter of law that both 
Plaintiffs had satisfied Utalf s threshold limit prior to the jury's verdict, holding that § 
31 A-22-309(a)( 1) had no requirement that medical expenses be "reasonable" or 
"necessary." R. 638:246-47, 643:14-15. This finding is not challenged on appeal. 
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Indeed, ii appears to be the majoriu of jurisdictions who have ruled ii is reversible 
error not to grant an additur or new trial where special damages are given, but no or nominal 
general damages. See, e.g., Kepler v. Kim, 843 P.2d 133. 137-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) 
(award of $0 in non-economic damages could not stand where a special damage award of 
S3,000 given for treatment and alleviation of pain); Kumorek v. Movers, 561 N.E.2d 212, 
215 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (verdict irreconcilably inconsistent and showed jury disregarded 
proven element of damages where jury awarded damages for extended medical treatment but 
awarded nothing for pain and suffering) Shei^wiy v. Hewer, 121 N.W. 2d 529, 532 (Iowa 
1963) (abuse of discretion to not grant a new trial where jury awrarded costs of medical 
expenses for treatment of pain and suffering yet nothing for general damages, since no 
logical basis can exist to award medical expenses necessary to treat pain and suffering yet 
not allow recovery for the same). The Wests therefore respectfully submit the trial court 
erred by making the legal conclusion that an award of substantial special damages does not 
require general damages compensation. 
Because the trial court's discretion relied upon an erroneous legal conclusion, the trial 
court's ruling should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(6); 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., P.2d 789, 805 n.19 (Utah 1991). In addition, as discussed 
below, one member of the jury held extreme biases and prejudices which were not disclosed 
during voir dire. This prejudice offers some explanation for the illogical nature of the 
verdict. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(2), (5). The undisputed facts show the trial court abused its 
discretion by refusing to grant the Wests' motion for additur or in the alternative a new trial 
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on damages. 
B. There Is No Competent Evidence to Support the Jury's Failure 
to Award Medical Expenses for the Spinal Cord Stimulator 
The second issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by not granting an additur, 
or in the alternative a new trial on damages, for the jury's failure to include special and 
general damages related to Mr. West's spinal cord stimulator where there was no testimony 
or evidence to contradict Mr. West's three expert witnesses who testified the spinal cord 
stimulator was damaged in the collision. The standard of review for this issue is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Crooks ton v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 
P.2d 789, 803-04 (Utah 1991). 
Again, Mr. West recognizes his duty to "marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding" on this issue. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). There are some items on the 
record which, if taken out of context, appear to support the jury's finding; however, this 
Court has held it takes competent evidence, and not any evidence, to support a jury verdict. 
See, e.g., Time Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis, 657 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah 1982). 
The facts reveal there is no competent evidence to support the jury's verdict in this regard. 
In his Memorandum in Support, Holley states "Dr. Webster testified it was possible 
Mr. West's SCS [spinal cord stimulator] lead had migrated after the accident, but conceded 
that he could not say to a reasonable degree of medical probability that it had migrated as 
a result of the accident/' Memorandum in Support at 4. Nevertheless, the record reveals Dr. 
Webster testified multiple times his opinion that the motor vehicle collision caused the leads 
of the spinal cord stimulator to change position, resulting in a different stimulation pattern. 
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R. 643:188-189, 194. 203, 210, 212-13, 218. 
Holley's reference is regarding x-rays taken during Dr. Clark's initial examination 
shortly after the collision. Dr. Webster testified these x-rays were poor, and he would have 
liked a confirmation x-ray to be ''absolutely confident" the spinal cord stimulator leads had 
moved in relation to prior x-rays taken after Mr. West's stimulator was initially inserted. R. 
643:185. Dr. Webster also testified it was "possible" the leads migrated more from the time 
of Dr. Clark's x-rays and Dr. Moreland's x-rays, R. 643:194-95, and that it was also 
"possible" the leads migrated prior to the collision, R. 643:211-12. However, Dr. Webster 
then testified such possibilities were not probable or likely. R. 643:212-13. Dr. Webster 
also testified difficulties with x-rays are accepted, and stated in his opinion the leads had 
moved. R. 643:182. Dr. Clark's x-ray was also consistent with the later x-ray taken by Dr. 
Morland, confirming lead migration at the time of Dr. Clark's x-rays shortly after the 
collision. R. 643:189, 198. 
Dr. Webster further testified Mr. West's testimony regarding abdominal cramping 
when turning on his stimulator immediately after the collision was precisely consistent with 
the migration suggested in the x-rays, leading him to conclude the collision caused the lead 
migration. R. 643:188-89. Counsel for Holley noted at trial some records where Mr. West's 
stimulus change was not described as abdominal cramping, R. 643:199-200, but Dr. Webster 
testified the language used in these medical records was consistent with stimulus in the 
muscle wall, R. 643:199. 
In denying Mr. West's motion, the trial court cited to Mr. West's chiropractic care as 
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the possible cause of the movement of the cord stimulator leads. R. 594-95. However, Dr. 
Clark testified he took extreme precautions to avoid any spinal manipulations in the area of 
Mr. West's stimulator or its leads, using small, precise, and delicate instrumentation called 
an activator any time treatments were administered in the area of Mr. West's spine. R. 
638:154,200-04. 
The record shows Mr. West received treatment in the lumbar spine, which was the 
area where his stimulator was implanted, on a sophisticated computerized physical 
rehabilitation machine called "MedX." R. 638:124-26, 211, but that Mr. West was given 
special padding to protect the stimulator. R. 639:47-48. The record reveals Dr. Clark had 
no expertise in spinal cord stimulators, R. 638:245, but also reveals Dr. Clark spoke with Dr. 
Rosenthal, who was an expert in this area, regarding the stimulator to ensure his treatment 
would not harm or interfere with the stimulator, R. 638:226-27. Most importantly, there is 
nothing in the record to support a conclusion that Mr. West's stimulator leads were altered, 
manipulated, or damaged in any way by chiropractic care; only suggestions that treatment 
involved the area where the stimulator was located. Such cannot be considered competent 
evidence to support a verdict. 
Holley noted at trial many of Dr. Clark's records included patient questionnaires 
filled out by Mr. West that did not mention pain in the area of Mr. West's lower extremity 
CRPS pain. R. 638:207-08. Dr. Clark then explained patients are instructed to fill out 
patient questionnaires only with information regarding one specific area of the spine, 
depending on what area is under rehabilitation. R. 638:224-25. 
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Most importantly, Dr. Clark testified he took an x-ray of Mr. West the first day during 
his initial exam in order to determine what treatment is appropriate. R. 638:197. As stated 
above, Dr. Webster provided expert testimony that these x-rays showed migration. R. 
643:182. The trial court's reliance on chiropractic manipulation for competent evidence to 
support the jury's verdict ignores the critical fact that the only expert witnesses who testified 
or provided medical testimony regarding these x-rays opined leads migration was visible in 
Dr. Clark's x-ray, before Mr. West received chiropractic care. R. 638:145. The temporal 
flaw in this argument cannot provide competent evidence. 
In addition to the above, Holley argued adjustments to Mr. West's stimulator to 
provide better coverage prior to the collision suggested migration of the leads before the 
collision. R. 639:30-32, 35-36. However, Dr. Webster, the only expert to opine regarding 
the stimulator, explained such adjustments were very common in the normal use of a 
stimulator. R. 643:188. Holley also argued Mr. West's trouble sleeping prior to the 
collision suggested pre-collision migration of the leads, R. 639:74-76; Mr. West then 
explained his trouble sleeping stemmed from laying on his side directly on the stimulator 
unit. 
Holley also elicited testimony regarding Mr. West's first visit to a physician following 
the collision at IHC Health Center, alleging Mr. West did not complain of stimulator related 
complications. R. 643:202. Yet the record from IHC Health Center reveals a follow up 
appointment was scheduled with Dr. Rosenthal and noted in the record, Mr. West's then-
treating physician regarding his stimulator. Holley further suggested Dr. Rosenthal' s records 
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indicate Mi. West was having no problems with his stimulator immediately following the 
collision. R. 643:213-15. By contrast, the record reveals Mr. West complained about a lack 
of coverage to Dr. Rosenthal in his first post collision visit, and received an adjustment of 
the stimulator which seemed to help. R.: 639:78. In Dr. Rosenthal's next visit he states Mr. 
West has had "no real change" the past month, which would have been the time frame after 
the collision, suggesting Mr. West continued to have the same problems he complained of 
post-collision. R. 643:213. In that visit, Dr. Rosenthal states he did not feel the need for 
further intervention. Id. 
Mr. West explained he had been contacting Dr. Rosenthal numerous times over the 
previous weeks, both regarding changes in his stimulator and regarding a report Mr. West 
needed for ongoing issues with his worker's compensation claim in California. R. 639:41. 
Mr. West explained Dr. Rosenthal's office was impatient with his inability to pay 
outstanding bills, and further explained Dr. Rosenthal refused to write the report and made 
clear he no longer wished to treat Mr. West. R. 639:43-44. Dr. Rosenthal's unwillingness 
to assist or treat Mr. West is supported by the fact that he refused to x-ray the leads upon Mr. 
West's requests, R. 639:40, even though Dr. Webster testified as a pain specialist he would 
immediately x-ray the stimulator leads following trauma and a report of changed stimulation, 
R. 643:189. Regardless, however, Dr. Rosenthal's statement that he did not feel further 
intervention was warranted cannot be tantamount to an opinion that the leads did not 
migrate. Dr. Rosenthal's medical records cannot therefore be regarded competent evidence 
to support the jury verdict. 
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Holley also argued medical records from psychologist Eugene Buckner. Ph.D., did 
not support his claim that the stimulator was not functioning, since Dr. Buckner had a 
medical record stating Mr. West reported his stimulator had been helpful in reducing pain. 
R. 639:80. However, not surprisingly this psychiatric record does not state or discuss 
whether the stimulator was working the same or worse than it had in the past, as Mr. West 
claimed at trial. Again, this evidence cannot be purported as competent evidence to support 
the verdict. 
Finally, Holley's only expert witness who testified regarding Mr. West's CRPS, Dr. 
Moress, testified he disputed whether Mr. West was properly diagnosed with CRPS. R. 
644:42, 50-51. However, upon cross examination, Dr. Moress conceded Mr. West in fact 
had chronic pain, R. 644:74-75, and he merely differed with the specific diagnosis of CRPS, 
R. 644:103. More importantly, Dr. Moress stated the surgical implantation of the stimulator 
was reasonable, R. 644:75, and discussion regarding whether Mr. West had CRPS or some 
other chronic pain was irrelevant, R. 644:105-06. Dr. Moress' testimony cannot therefore 
provide competent evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
Mr. West presented the testimony of one expert witness and the medical records 
evidence of two treating physicians, all of which opined that the leads to his spinal cord 
stimulator moved in the collision, resulting in his lost coverage from the stimulator and 
subsequent re-implantation. Holley has argued in his Memorandum in Support that no one 
testified to the "legally required medical opinion" that the spinal cord stimulator was 
damaged in the collision. Memorandum in Support at 10. The record reveals all three of 
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these physicians testified Mr. West's stimulator damage was related to the collision. 
Doctors Johan and Morland both stated in their medical records their opinion that the 
automobile collision caused the damage to the spinal cord stimulator, and these records were 
admitted into evidence. Defendant's Exhibit 1; sec Addendum 1. Again, Dr. Webster 
testified on multiple occasions that, in his expert opinion, the leads were moved in the 
collision. R. 643:188-89, 194, 203, 210, 212-13, 218. 
Holley argues, without citing to authority, that the "legally required medical opinion" 
is that Mr. West's physicians must testify to a "reasonable degree of medical probability 
[that] Mr. West's spinal cord stimulator was damaged in the collision with Holley," and that 
no one provided such testimony on behalf of Mr. West. Memorandum in Support at 10. 
However, in the medical records of Dr. Morland, he states: "[I]t would be my opinion, based 
on a reasonable medical probability, that the motor vehicle accident was the cause of his 
spinal stimulator lead migration." Defendant's Exhibit No. 1; see also Exhibit "A." 
Furthermore, no jury instruction was given requiring medical (or other expert ) 
testimony to be stated to a "reasonable degree of medical probability," nor is this a proper 
statement of the legal standard. Rather, jury instructions required Mr. West to prove 
damages by "a preponderance of the evidence." R. 405, 416, 417. While the phrase 
"medical probability" may be used, it is not required. In reviewing the standard for expert 
testimony in both civil and criminal cases, this Court in State v. Jarrell 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 
1980), held: 
The general rule regarding the certainty of an expert's opinion is that 
the expert may not give an opinion which represents a mere guess. 
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speculation, or conjecture. Expert medical opinion evidence based on a 
probability, possibility, or likelihood has been admitted, however, where the 
witnesses expressed statements in language which sufficiently represented 
their own best judgment to a reasonable certainty. 
Id. at 230 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Mr. West's three physicians unquestionably 
satisfied this standard, and it therefore became incumbent upon Holley to rebut that 
testimony. 
The precise exchange referred by Holley between his counsel and Dr. Webster was 
as follows: 
Q. Okay. Okay. With respect to that x-ray that we talked about a 
moment ago, the one from Dr. Clark [chiropractor] on the 17th of January, ten 
days after the accident, you can't say to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability that there is a migration with that lead, can you, from that x-ray? 
A. I think I can say with reasonable degree of possibility there is 
migration. I would want a conformation x-ray to be certain. 
Q. Okay. And why is that? 
A. Because it's poor technique. But even with poor technique, we 
often make judgments and determine how to proceed clinically. 
Q. Okay. Can you say to a reasonable degree of medical probability 
whether the migration from that Clark x-ray on January 17th is the same 
amount of migration that we see several months later in October of that year? 
A. I think that the x-rays are consistent. What I see on Dr. Clark's x-
ray is consistent with what I saw in Dr. Morland's x-rays. 
Q. Is it possible there's been more of a migration? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Since the time of January 17th to October 18th of the same year. 
A. There's a possibility. 
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Pv. 643:194-95. Just prior to this questioning, Mr. West's counsel elicited the following 
testimony: 
Q. All right. Doctor, based on your view of the records, and your own 
experience in this field, and your view of the x-rays, do you have an opinion 
as to what was the cause of the spinal cord stimulator leads to move in Mr. 
West? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. My opinion is that the motor vehicle accident did precipitate a 
change in the position of the electrodes that caused a different stimulation 
pattern. That's based upon the x-rays, but also and probably more important 
to me is the comment he made when he went to the InstaCare, and then later 
that he felt the different type of stimulation pattern, particularly the abdominal 
wrall muscle cramping. That's generally diagnostic for a lateral movement of 
the lead, because the pain that we try to cover is very mid-line. And the 
further the lead goes laterally, the more abdominal musculature, or nerves, we 
will be stimulating. 
So for patients who come into my office and report, Now, I'm getting 
muscle cramps in my abdomen, I automatically get an x-ray, because I assume 
the lead has moved laterally. That is to me the most important part of the 
history, and that occurred right after the motor vehicle accident. 
R. 643:188-89. 
The record shows Dr. Webster's testimony clearly satisfied the requirement for expert 
witness testimony by this Court's decision in JarrelL 608 P.2d at 230. Holley presented no 
testimony to contradict or rebut Mr. West's evidence from Dr. Webster or his two treating 
physicians. Thus, there was no competent evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the 
trial court therefore erred by failing to grant Mr. Wesf s motion for an additur or in the 
alternative a new triai on damages related to his spinal cord stimulator. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred bv Refusing to Conduct a 
More Through Examination of Juror Weinmuller 
Regarding Her Alleged Misconduct And Biases 
The third issue is whether the trial court erred by refusing to conduct a more through 
examination of Juror Weinmuller regarding her alleged misconduct and biases. The 
standard of review on appeal is set forth in State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f43: "As a 
general rule, trial judges have some discretion in limiting voir dire inquiry. . . . However, 
the trial judge's discretion narrows to the extent that questions do have some possible link 
to possible bias, and when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an 
actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such inquiries." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Holley has argued in his Motion for Summary Disposition the Wests have improperly 
stated the standard of review on appeal. Memorandum in Support at 12. Holley argues the 
Wests' cite to State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, is inappropriate since it is a 
criminal case, and instead cites Rasmussen v. Sharpata, 895 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
a personal injury case. The Wests have been unable to find any case law suggesting a 
distinction between criminal and civil law in this area of the law. More importantly, 
however, the Court of Appeals in Rasmussen cites, in support of its conclusion regarding 
the standard of review on appeal, the earlier Court of Appeals decision in State v. Saunders, 
893 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) that was subsequently overruled by the Utah Supreme 
Court. See Rasmussen, 895 P.2d at-394; Saunders, 1999 Utah 59, ffl[l, 33-47,992 P.2d 951. 
This Court's opinion in Saunders provides the correct standard of review on this issue. 
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Pursuant to this Court's decision in State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445,451 (Utah 1989 h 
the trial court in its memorandum decision determined a post trial hearing was needed with 
Juror Weinmuller to explore the truthfulness of her answers during voir dire and whether 
any improper juror conduct occurred. R. 591-93. In its Memorandum decision, the trial 
court stated it would continue its practice to conduct voir dire directly, but invited counsel 
to twsuggest questions or verbiage" and stated counsel would be invited to suggest follow up 
questions necessary during the hearing. R. 592. 
Both counsel submitted suggested voir dire questions to the court. R. 601, 604. 
However, the court did not use either questions suggested by counsel, and proceeded to ask 
what may be fairly described as very brief, delicate questioning to Ms. Weinmuller. 
Although the trial court's questioning was limited, Ms. Weinmuller did not hesitate to reveal 
significant biases. Moreover, she revealed that she did not truthfully respond to the court's 
questioning during voir dire. 
Counsel for the Wests made multiple objections to the trial court regarding its refusal 
to ask more questions to Ms. Weinmuller. R. 637:12-13. In spite of those objections, the 
trial court refused to further explore Ms. Weinmuller's potential bias, refused to ask any 
questions regarding her potential bias against awards for general damages, refused to inquire 
about improper conversations with other jurors prior to jury deliberation, and instead 
proceeded to make its ruling. 
This Court in Saunders made clear that the trial court's discretion in determining what 
questions to pose to jurors is not unlimited: "In State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1998), 
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this Court declared that although a trial judge has discretion in limiting voir dire 
examination, that discretion must be 'liberally exercised' in favor of allowing counsel to 
illicit necessary infomiation for ferreting out bias, whether for a for-cause or a peremptory 
challenge. . . . [Tjrial counsel should be given considerable latitude in asking voir dire 
questions . . . . Voir dire should not be restricted to a 'stark little exercise' which discloses 
little." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, |34,992 P.2d 951 (quoting State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 
845 (Utah 1998)) (emphasis in original). 
To further elaborate on what might be aptly described as a "sliding scale" of 
discretion afforded to trial judges, this Court went on to state in Saunders: 
As a general rule, trial judges have some discretion in limiting voir dire 
inquiry. That discretion is most broad when it is exercised with respect to 
questions that have no apparent link to any potential bias. However, the trial 
judge's discretion narrows to the extent that questions do have some possible 
link to possible bias, and when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the 
existence of an actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must 
allow such inquires. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f43, 992 P.2d 951 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This Court 
has defined "bias" as "not necessarily a bias in favor of or against the prosecution, or in 
favor of or against the defendant, but a bias that would interfere in any manner with a juror's 
deciding evidentiary issues fairly and objectively and applying objectively the rules of law 
given to the jury by the trial judge." Id at f 44. 
In this case, the trial court's questioning immediately revealed that Ms. Weinmuller 
failed to honestly answer a material question on voir dire. Moreover, the trial court's 
questioning revealed Ms. Weinmuller had extremely strong opinions about individuals who 
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had made worker's compensation claims against her and her husband as business owners in 
California. Obviously, Mr. West's history of worker's compensation claims while working 
at Ralph's Grocery Store in California directly related Ms. Weinmuller's strong biases to the 
litigation. Indeed, the trial court specifically made a finding on the record that Ms. 
Weinmuller's strong biases were "factually and directly related to this case without 
question." R. 637:19. 
Since the trial court's limited questioning revealed the existence of an actual bias, the 
court's discretion to allow further inquiries "disappear [ed]. The trial court must allow such 
inquiries." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^[43. Holley relies on the trial court's efforts at 
theoretical rehabilitation. Memorandum in Support at 13-14. In that vein, the following 
language from Saunders is directly on point: 
Ruling that a prospective juror is qualified to sit simply because he says 
he will be fair ignores the common-sense psychological and legal reality of the 
situation. It is not uncommon for people to believe that their "biases" are in 
fact nonbiased objective judgments that are true and correct. . . . 
We now make emphatically clear that a juror's statement alone that he 
or she can decide a case fairly pursuant to the law given by the trial court is 
not a sufficient basis for qualifying a juror to sit when the prospective juror's 
answers provide evidence of possible bias and the trial court does not allow 
further questions designed to probe the extent and the depth of the bias. 
Preventing such further inquiry and concluding the issue by taking a juror's 
conclusory statement that he or she will not be affected by a particular attitude 
or will decide the case fairly is not sufficient. 
Id. at ^35-36 (emphasis added). 
Not only did the trial court fail to ask more questions regarding Ms. Weinmuller's 
bias, the trial court failed fully to ask any questions regarding her strong biases and opinions 
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against general damages and alleged discussions with other jurors prior to deliberations, as 
averred by juror Stacie Bersie. R. 468. In light of Ms. Weinmuller's failure to honestly 
answer material voir dire questions, the trial court erred by failing to allow further questions 
whether Ms. Weinmuller followed instructions not to discuss the facts of the case with her 
husband or daughter after Ms. Weinmuller denied having done so. The trial court therefore 
abused its discretion in limiting voir dire, and should be reversed on this issue. 
D. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Not Finding Sufficient 
Basis to Have Stricken Juror Weinmuller For Cause. 
The fourth issue is whether the trial court erred by finding Ms. Weinmuller's bias 
against persons who have made worker's compensation claims and personal injury claims 
did not provide sufficient basis for a challenge for cause. The standard of review for trial 
court's determination of whether to excuse a juror for cause is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion. Jenkins v. Panish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1931). "We view the trial court's 
exercise of discretion, however, 'in light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any 
problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another.'" State v. 
Wash, 2001 UT 35,1J25, 24 P.3d 948 (quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536). 
Although the trial court's questioning was extremely brief, Ms. Weinmuller revealed 
that she failed to honestly answer a material question on voir dire. Upon questioning from 
the court about whether her experiences of having her employees make worker's 
compensation claims left her with negative feelings toward the courts or going to court, Ms. 
Weinmuller made the following response: "Well, with the Workman's Comp you know, we 
got sued so many times. You know we got employees who got injured other places than our 
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place of employment." R. 637:7-8. When the court asked if any of those claims went to 
court, the following exchange occurred: 
A. Well it never even got to court because the lawyers in California, 
they said it would cost more to go to court than to settle out of court. And so 
we settled out of court and we wound up paying everything. 
Q [by the court]. Did that leave you with a negative feeling toward the 
court system? 
A. Well, it taught me a good lesson in life. It taught me about people. 
And it's really not a negative feeling, not a disgruntled feeling about people, 
just that I'm very leery of people. I can feel when a sham is being presented 
to me and I can discern. 
R. 637:9. The court then asked Ms. Weinmuiler the following question: 
Q [by the court]. Now the question I would have asked you at the time 
had you given these answers to me at the time would have been: Having had 
those experiences and those circumstances in California, can you or would 
you judge this case based on its own facts, and on the law and circumstances 
as presented in this case? 
A. I would have qualified myself, definitely, because Fve had that 
happen to me throughout the years. It happened many times, you know, being 
an employer. 
Id. Ms. Weinmuller's answer to this question clearly shows she wished to qualify herself 
as a juror not because she felt she was able to be unbiased, but because of her biases and 
prior negative experiences. Indeed, this answer suggests Ms. Weinmuiler may have hoped 
to obtain some sort of retribution or vindication for what she perceived were false claims 
being made by her former California employees. 
Finally, the following exchange occurred: 
Q [by the court]. .. . Did you consider this case on its own merits? Or 
did you consider what happened to you in California? 
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A. No. 1 looked at this man. My feelings about him were that this 
was a sixteen-year-old boy that got injured in the knee, and for ten years he 
was bilking the Ralph's Grocery Company. He comes here and he has a 
fender bender. And he's accustomed to receiving easy money and he wants 
to do the same thing again. He had lawsuits here, in Idaho, and he was going 
back to California with one. And so I looked at him and thought this is a 
young man that likes to bilk the system." 
R. 637:10 (emphasis added). Again, this line of questioning unabashedly reveals Ms. 
Weinmuller's inability to set aside her prior negative experiences with California worker's 
compensation claims. Even when Ms. Weinmuller seemingly wishes to appear unbiased, 
she undeniably demonstrates her prior experiences affected her judgment against Mr. West. 
Although the merits of Mr. West's California worker's compensation claim were not at 
issue, Ms. Weinmuller concluded on her own that his claim was bogus, and used that 
conclusion as the basis for her determination in Mr. West's case. Ms. Weinmuller's 
comments suggest Mr. West had lost his case with Ms. Weinmuller merely by virtue of 
having made a worker's compensation claim in California. 
This Court has held when a juror has failed to disclose pertinent information during 
voir dire, the trial court should grant a new trial if the moving party demonstrates, first, "a 
juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire" and (2) "a correct response 
would have provided a valid basis for challenge for cause." State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 
245 (Utah 1992) (quoting McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 US 548, 
556 (1984). In this case, the trial court ruled that the first prong of McDonough was 
satisfied, finding Ms. Weinmuller made a falsehood or misstatement of fact during voir dire. 
R. 637:18. That finding is not challenged on appeal. However, the Wests challenge the trial 
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court's ruling that the second prong of the McDonough test, that a correct response would 
have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause, was not satisfied. R. 637:19-21. 
Challenges for cause are governed by Rule 47 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 47 states, in pertinent part, the following: 
Challenges for cause may be taken on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially 
and without prejudice to the substantial rights to the parties challenging . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f) (emphasis added). This Court has stated trial courts should "err on the 
side of caution in ruling on for-cause challenges and that the scope of judicial discretion 
accorded a trial judge must be evaluated in light of the ease with which all issues of bias can 
be dispensed by the simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose 
neutrality is not open to question." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f519 992 P.2d 951. 
This Court has also held that jurors who reveal facts which show a "tendency for 
prejudice" or "suggest a bias" should be stricken for cause. Jenkins v. Parrish, 676 P. 2d 
533, 536 (Utah 1981). The trial court's efforts to "rehabilitate" Ms. Weinmuller, 
notwithstanding the fact that the hands of time could not turn back to effectuate such 
rehabilitation, is insufficient. "'It is unrealistic to expect that any but the most sensitive and 
thoughtful jurors (frequently those least likely to be biased) will have the personal insight, 
candor and openness to raise their hand in court and declare themselves biased.' . . . Ruling 
that a perspective juror is qualified to sit simply because he says he will be fair ignores the 
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common-sense psychological and legal reality of the situation.'' Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 
<J1[34-35, 992 P.2d 951 (quoting State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984)). Ms. 
Weinmuller" s inability to answer questions about her being unbiased without interj ecting her 
bias reveals a clear tendency for bias and prejudice, and the trial court therefore abused its 
discretion in holding Ms. Weinmuller's biases did not provide sufficient basis for a 
challenge for cause. 
E. The Trial Court's Legal Conclusion Was Erroneous That Deprevation 
of the Right to Use a Peremptory Challenge for a Juror Who Sits on the 
Jury and Is Biased Does Not Require Ordering a New Trial. 
The fifth issue is whether the trial court erred upon finding Juror Weinmuller failed 
to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, that Plaintiffs would have used an early 
peremptory challenge to strike her from the panel had she provided honest answers during 
voir dire, and that Juror Weinmuller held feelings and biases prejudicial to the Plaintiffs, but 
made the legal conclusion that only biases sufficient to warrant a challenge for cause can 
result in a new trial. This issue involves the application of law to the undisputed findings 
of the trial court on the record. There is no issue of facts to be reviewed, but only 
conclusions of law. Such issues are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court is accorded 
no particular deference on appeal. See e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 
1994); State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, [^26, 20 P.3d 888. 
For the benefit of appeal, the trial court made explicit findings on the record. R. 
637:18. Although the trial court found the first prong of the McDonough test, that Ms. 
Weinmuller failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, was satisfied, the 
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court expressed uncertainty whether this Court's plurality opinion in State v. Thomas, 830 
P.2d 243 (Utah 1992), requires biases sufficient to warrant granting a challenge for cause 
to grant a new trial, or whether new trials should also be granted for the loss of a peremptory 
challenge where the juror who sat on the jury was in fact biased. R. 637:16-21. 
The trial court explicitly found that Ms. Weinmuller had strong, negative feelings on 
an issue that was "factually and directly related*' to this case: Mr. West's prior worker's 
compensation claim, which the trial court found Ms. Weinmuller to have thought "was 
repugnant." R. 637:19-20. Although the trial court did not find her feelings and biases rose 
to the level to warranting a challenge for cause, the trial court found: "Plainly, this is a 
circumstance where she would have been an early preemptory [sic] challenge. So what Fm 
leaving on the record is Fm finding that Counsel would have had a strong basis and reason 
to exercise a preemptory [sic] challenge, but that the evidence and the response would not 
have risen to a challenge for cause." Id. 
While the trial court expressed uncertainty on the state of the law, the Wests 
respectfully submit this Court has previously held a new trial is appropriate where a moving 
party who lost a peremptory challenge can show the juror who sat on the jury as a result was 
partial or incompetent. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, 1J29; 20 P.3d 888. 
In Evans, during trial the court learned a juror failed to answer a voir dire question 
correctly. The trial court found the first prong of the McDonough test was satisfied; 
however, the trial court then found that the correct answer to voir dire did not provide a 
sufficient basis to strike the juror for cause. Id. at ^24-25. The defendant then argued that 
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had he known the correct answer from the juror during voir dire, he would have removed 
that juror with a peremptory challenge. Id. at j^29. This Court found the defendant "failed 
to show how his inability to use a peremptory challenge to remove Hansen resulted in 
prejudice." The Court then held in order to succeed on a motion for a new trial, the moving 
party must show "that the jury that sat in his case was partial or biased." Id. 
Although this authority was cited to the trial court, the trial court refused to apply this 
controlling Supreme Court case law. However, the trial court did find the loss of a 
peremptory challenge did in fact result in a juror who actually sat on the trial who was partial 
or biased. R. 637:20-21. The trial court's legal conclusion was erroneous and the Wess 
respectfully submit the trail court should be ordered to grant a new trial. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The verdict with respect to the Wests general damages is inherently inconsistent and 
against Utah law; the trial court should therefore be reversed and ordered to enter an additur 
in favor of the Wests for spinal related injuries, or in the alternative a newr trial on general 
damages relating to the Wests spinal injuries. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5), (6). The verdict 
with respect to Mr. West's stimulator is not supported by competent evidence, and the trial 
court's refusal to grant Mr. West's motion for an additur or, in the alternative, a new trial 
regarding damages related to his spinal cord stimulator should likewise be reversed. Id. 
Alternatively, the Wests respectfully submit the trial court's holding that Ms. 
Weinmuller's bias did not rise to the level sufficient to warrant a challenge for cause is 
erroneous, and request this Court to order a new trial pursuant to State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 
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243,245 (Utah 1992). Should this Court determine a challenge for cause was not warranted, 
under the trial court's undisputed findings that the Wests would have used a peremptory 
challenge to strike Ms. Weinmuller. the Wests submit this Court should order a new trial 
pursuant to its holding in State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, f>9; 20 P.3d 888, since Ms. 
Weinmuller remained on the jury. 
Finally, should this Court determine only challenges for cause warrant granting a new 
trial under Thomas, and further find Ms. Weinmuller's comments are insufficient to warrant 
a challenge for case, the Wests submit the trial court erred by failing to further question Ms. 
Weinmuller regarding her alleged misconduct and biases. The Wests therefore respectfully 
request the Court order an additional post trial hearing and grant the Wests full opportunity 
to further explore Ms. Weinmuller's alleged misconduct and biases in a manner consistent 
with this Courf s opinions set forth above. 
DATED this [0 day of December, 2002. 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD, P.C. 
:LD 
MARK T. FLICKINGER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
A^ME [k)jt<l£rt $tjy{±J(/^) 
10/18/2000 STEVEN WEST .. page 2 .. : — 
He has been treated with chiropractic treatment for his work injury and saw 
another physician for the stimulator. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Is otherwise relatively unremarkable. He had a dislocated 
patella in 1999. 
FAMILY HISTORY: Notable for asthma. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: He is currently employed at American Homes. He is married. There 
is litigation regarding both the motor vehicle accident in January, as well as 
his Workmen's Comp claim. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: Refer to work sheet. Noncontributory. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Well developed male. No apparent cardiovascular distress. 
He is ableto heel and toe walk. Thoracolumbar range of motion is full. Lungs 
are clear. COR SI, S2, no added sounds or murmurs. Abdomen is soft, nontender. 
Slightly overweight. Extremities, he is sensitive to touch at the knee on the 
left. Range of motion is full. No ligamentous laxity. Good moisture in the 
skin. Reflexes are 2+ and symmetric. Plantar responses are flexor. Peripheral 
pulses are 2+ and symmetric. 
STIMULATOR REPROGRAMMING: Stimulator was reprogrammed. He is currently case 
positive, 3 negative. I tried multiple combinations. I was unable to get 
stimulation into an appropriate distribution. He says the therapy time is 100% 
off. In other words, he has not used the machine for an extended period of time 
over 8,149 hours. I may be interpreting that wrong. It might have been just on 
continuously at a low amplitude. 
ASSESSMENT: It seems that there was a clear change in his pain relief following 
the motor vehicle accident. This is generally associated with a migration of the 
lead into a position that no longer captures paresthesias in an appropriate 
distribution. 
Therefore, I would like to get x-rays to determine the location of the lead and 
make sure it is midline and make sure it is approximately T10. 
Similarly, I will spend more time with him next time checking his compliance, as 
well as determining whether there dre any problems with impedances. There is 
nothing that I can do at this time to improve his situation, 
(dictated by JHM:mac/t:11/12) 
11/8/2000 STEVEN WEST 
Letter to Ms. McQevitt, Worker's Compensation. /mao 
Rehabilitation Medicine of Idaho 
222 North 2nd Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
- ^ 
LL 
COPY 
JAMES MORLAND, M.I>. 
Pain Management & Rehabilitation 
Medicine Of Idaho 
October 25, 2000 
10: M*i. Mr. Ilrvll.l. 
Workmen's Compensation 
RE: STEVEN WEST 
Dear Ms. Mc Devitt: 
Mr. Steven R. West comes in today for revaluation. He reports that his spinal 
stimulator has not worked well following a motor vehicle accident, as listed in 
my letter of 10/16/2000. 
X-rays have been obtained and the interspinal stimulator catheter is lying far 
to the left side, pretty much in the left lateral gutter. I doubt this was the 
original position. 
I reprogrammed his stimulator for approximately forty five minutes today and 
attempted various combinations. None of them provide adequate coverage. Most 
of them refer pain into the flank, which is really the typical pattern for a lead 
that has migrated too far laterally. 
At this stage, I think it is likely that the wire needs to be repositioned. I 
would like to obtain his original x-rays and I have asked him to sign a medical 
release to Orem Community Hospital, as well as Dr. Clark, the chiropractor who 
has been seeing him after his more recent motor vehicle accident. 
Hopefully that will shed some light as to whether or not the stimulator lead has 
moved, how far it has moved and where the appropriate placement should be, as 
well as may give some indication of causation, i.e. if the lead did indeed shift 
following the motor vehicle accident. 
I will see him back after hard copies of those x-rays are available, at which 
time, assuming I am correct, we will discuss options for repositioning the 
stimulator lead. 
Sincerely yours, 
orland. M.D. 
Anderson Plaza 
222 North 2nd Street. Suite 202 • Boise, Idaho 83702 
JAMES MORLAND, M.D. 
Pain Management & Rehabilitation 
Medicine Of Idaho 
November 8, 2000 
Mr,. Mc: Dovil.l. 
Worker's Compensation 
Senior Administrator 
PO Box 54143 
Los Angeles, CA 
RE: CLAIMANT: 
EMPLOYER: 
DOI: 
FILE #: 
90054 
STEVEN WEST 
RALPH'S GROCERY 
1/18/92 
1913015 
Dear Ms. Mc Devitt: 
Steven West came in today for revaluation. I have received copies of his 
original x-rays from February of 1999. 
In comparison of the old x-rays with the new x-rays, it is clear that there has 
been approximately 1 to 1.5 cm of inferior migration of the lead of his 
MedTronics spinal stimulator. 
There may also be some lateral displacement. 
This lead migration explains why we are no longer able to get appropriate 
stimulation for this patient and why his spinal stimulator is no longer 
beneficial. 
I do not have the x-rays that were taken immediately after his motor vehicle 
accident and, therefore, at this stage I cannot state with any certainty whether 
this occurred following the motor vehicle accident or at some time later than 
that. 
Therefore, I guess there may be issues of who ultimately should be covering this, 
i.e. whether this is motor vehicle versus Workmen's Comp. 
Hopefully we will be getting more information from his chiropractor. 
At any rate, the treatment for this is obviously is to reposition his stimulator 
so that he gets paresthesias in appropriate distribution. 
COPY 
Anderson Plaza 
North 2nd Street, Suite 202 • Boise, Idaho 83702 
November 8, 2000 
RE: CLAIMANT: 
EMPLOYER: 
DOI: 
FILE #: 
Page 2 
STEVEN WEST 
RALPH'S GROCERY 
1/18/92 
1913015 
To accomplish this, I would like him to see Dr. Timothy Johans, a neurosurgeon 
with a great deal of experience in placement and manipulation of spinal 
stimulators, and this will be scheduled for the next available appointment with 
Dr. Johans. 
Sincerely yours, 
H. Morland, M.D. 
JHM:mao 
t:ll/13 
JAMES MORLAND, M.D. 
Pain Management & Rehabilitation 
Medicine Of Idaho 
December 27, 2000 
Trror.n Mc Olvll.t. 
Workers Compensation 
Ralph's Grocery Company 
PO Box 54143 
Los Angeles, CA 90054 
RE: STEVEN WEST 
Dear Teresa: 
I am in receipt of your le t te r , dated December 19, 2000, regarding Mr. Steven 
West. 
I have not received x-rays by Dr. Clark following Mr. West's automobile accident. 
Therefore, my opinion basically hasn't changed. Based on the history that Mr. 
West gives, I think i t is l i ke ly that lead migration of his spinal stimulator is 
related to the motor vehicle accident. 
To further define t h i s , I would need to see the x-rays from Dr. Clark's of f ice 
to document whether lead migration was present at the time he saw Dr. Clark, or 
i f lead migration occurred sometime following his v i s i t with Dr. Clark. 
Thank you for your correspondence. 
Sincerely yours, 
H. Morland, M.D. 
JHM:mao 
t : l / 3 . b 
o, Ofc y 
Anderson Plaza 
222 North 2nd Street, Suite 202 • Boise, Idaho 33702 
JAMES MORLAND, M.D. 
Pain Management & Rehabilitation 
Medicine Of Idaho 
January 31, 2001 
Lisa Mc Uevitt 
Worker's Compensation 
Ralph's Grocery Company 
PO Box 54143 
Los Angeles, CA 90054 
RE: STEVEN WEST 
Dear Ms. Mc Devitt: 
I sent you a letter December 27. 2000, regarding Mr. Steven West. At that time 
I had not had an opportunity to review the x-rays performed by Dr. Clark 
following an automobile accident involving Mr. West. 
Today I have had the opportunity to review those x-rays. The films, particularly 
the lateral films, clearly show that the lead migrated as of 1/17/2000, and I 
believe the accident was approximately 1/7/2000. 
Therefore, based on both the history provided by Mr. West that the spinal cord 
stimulator was no longer working after his accident, as well as the x-ray 
evidence provided by Dr. Clark's evaluation, i t would be my opinion, based on a 
reasonable medical probability, that the motor vehicle accident was the cause of 
his spinal stimulator lead migration. 
Sincerely yours, 
Morland, M.D. 
t :2/ l 
COPY 
Anderson Plaza 
222 North 2nd Street, Suite 202 • Boise, Idaho 83702 
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1075 NORTH CURTIS ROAD, SUITE 200 
BOISE, IDAHO 83706-1273 
TIMOTHY J. JOHANS, M.D. 
NEUROLOGICAL SURGEON 
N o v e m b e r 1 7 , 2 0 00 
TELEPHONE (208) 367-3500 
FACSIMILE (208) 367-2968 
James K Moriand, MD 
222 North 2nd Street 
Boise ID 83702 
Dear Jim, 
Suite 202 
RE: Stephen R. West 
Thanks so very much for sending .Steve West to the neurosurgery 
clinic today, November 14, 2 000. What a nice guy. As you know, he 
has a very interesting history. He is 25 years old and at the age 
•of 17, he was chasing down some runaway grocery carts before they 
hit an automobile and they side-swiped his left knee. He had a 
knee injury'and had two subsequent surgeries on his knee. He went 
on to develop reflex sympathetic dystrophy and chronic regional 
pain syndrome which was eventually diagnosed via bone scan. Dr. 
Cheryl Rowley, an anesthesiologist and pain specialist, saw him and 
put in.-a spinal cord stimulator. He had terrific results-from that 
and great stimulation until January 7, 2000. She put this in 
February of 1999. He was in an automobile accident and he 
remembers immediately losing his stimulation. Eventually through 
manipulation'of the impulse-generator, there was verification that 
he has stimulation but it is higher than it was. You have 
documented that the electrode seems to have moved and I agree. 
I think it is in his best interest to have the electrodes replaced 
in that he no longer has stimulation in the' proper position. It 
seems causally related to the automobile accident. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: As above with the knee surgeries and spinal 
cord implant. He takes no medicines. Versed made him have intense 
emotional feelings and fear but not a true allergic reaction. 
FAMILY HISTORY: Heart disease and asthma. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: He has two children. He lives with his wife and 
children. He does not smoke or drink. No risk factors for AIDS. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: Extensively delineated in the patient's health 
history in the chart. The pertinent positives are headaches and 
numbness right at one of his anterior knee incisions, joint pain in 
the knee, some weakness of the muscles around the left knee and 
some back tain. 
PHYSICAL EXAM: Pulse: Mid 3 0 's and regular. Reso : 12-14 and. 
unlabored. Temp: Afebrile. He is a pleasant man in nc acute 
distress. Psychiatric: Patient is awake, alert and oriented to 
RE: Stephen R. West 
November 17, 2 0 00 
Pacre 2 
person, place and time. Mood and affect is good. Judgement 
appears good. Recent and remote memory are good. Cranial nerves 
II-XII are normal. Head is normocephalic and atraumatic. 
Conjunctiva and lids are normal. External ears and nose are okay. 
Oropharynx is normal. Teeth and gums are normal. Neck: Full range 
of motion. Good carotid upstrokes. No thyromegaly or masses. 
Trachea is midline. Chest: Clear.'*- Normal respiratory effort. 
Cardiovascular: Regular rate and rhythm without murmurs, rubs or 
bruits. Abdomen:- Soft.and nontender. No hepatosplenomegaly or 
masses. Musculoskeletal: No cyanosis, clubbing or edema. Tone is 
normal. No atrophy. Strength everywhere is normal. Reflexes are 
normal. I did not check the reflex of the left patella. He. has 
dysesthetic pain in the anterior left thigh, and anterior left 
shin. 
I did .review his plain films. Although there is a difference in 
technique, there seems to be displacement of the electrode. 
ASSESSMENT/PLAN: Even though the films are suggestive, I think the 
'history is most suggestive that something happened at the 
automobile, accident such that he lost proper stimulation in his 
area of dysesthetic pain in the anterior shin and thigh. In that 
the pain is quite disabling for him and considering he had very 
good results with his pain from the stimulation, I think it is in 
his best interest to replace the electrode. Curiously the impulse 
generator is placed exactly in his belt line and he would love to 
have that replaced also. Now that is not causally related to the 
accident' and should he want that replaced, I could do that on a 
later date if necessary. 
I told him that the goals of the surgery are to regain stimulation 
in- the anterior left leg. The risks are bleeding, infection, CSF 
fistula. Despite knowing that, he would like to proceed. As soon 
as I have coverage from the insurance company, we will move along 
in that direction. Thank you, again. 
Sine ere lyf, 
/ 
Timothy/ u . \ Johans , MD, FACS 
/ 
/ 
i^ u : cea 
Dictated: 11/14/0 0 
Transcribed: 11/17/Q0 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 J 
The fact that I have instructed you concerning damages is not to be taken as an 
indication that I either believe or do not believe that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover 
such damages. The instructions in reference to damages are given as a guide in case you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. 
However, if you determine that there should be no recovery, then you will entirely 
disregard the instructions given you upon the matter of damages. 
If you find, for instance, that the plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict in accordance 
with these instructions, but you do not find that the evidence before you is sufficient to 
show that the plaintiffs have sustained any substantial damages, then you may return a 
verdict for the plaintiffs on one or more of the theories of liability and fix the amount of 
general damages in a nominal sum, such as $1.00. 
On the other hand, if you determine that the Defendant is liable and that the 
Plaintiffs have suffered substantial damages then you should use these instructions to 
guide your determination of an appropriate and reasonable damage award. 
In this case there are two Plaintiffs who, although they are related, are entitled to 
have their claims in this regard considered separately. It is entirely possible for you to 
determine that the Defendant is responsible or liable for the accident and resulting injuries 
but then to determine that either or both of the Plaintiffs are or are not entitled to an 
award of damages. 
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I N D E X 
WITNESS PAGE NO. 
SUSAN WEINMULLER 
Direct Examination by The Court 5 
r a g e <*• 
[ I ] P R O C E E D I N G S 
[ 2] December 12th, 2001 
[ 3] THE COURT: This is West v. Holley. 
[ 4] MR. FLICKINGER: Your Honor, if we may approach. 
[ 5] THE COURT: Sure. 
[ 6] (Side-bar discussion with the Court & both Counsel.) 
[ 7] THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Weinmuller, we appreciate you 
[ 8] coming in this morning. Would you come forward, please. 
[ 9] I'll have the clerk place Ms. Weinmuller under oath. 
[10] 
[ I I ] SUSAN WEINMULLER 
[12] called by the Court, having been duly 
[13] sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
[14] 
[15] THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony 
[16] you are about to give in the case now before the Court will 
[17] be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
[18] help you God? 
[19] THE WITNESS: I d a 
[20] THE COURT: Thank you. Have a seat right up here. 
[21 ] Now as I've indicated in my ruling, Counsel, I do 
[22] consider this to be an extension of voir dire. And so it is 
[23] my practice and it will be my continued practice to conduct 
[24] that questioning myself. When I have concluded if you have 
[25] additional matters you want to cover, if you want to come up 
Page 5 
[ 1 ] we'll discuss it at that point. 
[ 2 ] I have reviewed both voir dire questions from both 
[ 3] sides now. I read through them very quickly. There's not a 
[ 4] lot of surprises there, and I think I'm comfortable with what 
[ 5 ] I need to cover. 
[ 6 ] 
[ 7] DIRECT EXAMINATION 
[ 8] BY THE COURT: 
[ 9] QL Let's have you begin by just telling us your name. 
[10] A. Susan Adele Weinmuller. 
[11] OL And you served as a juror in the case of West versus 
[12] Holley; is that correct? 
[13] A. I did. 
[14] Q. We do have some follow-up questions relating first 
[15] of all to voir dire or the process of choosing a jury. 
[16] At one point, if you'll recall, I defined you and a close 
[17] family member as to include you yourself, your spouse, your 
[18] children and your parents. Do you recall that? 
[19] A. Yes. 
[20] a And after defining that I asked you the question if 
[21 ] you or a close family member had ever been involved as a 
[22] plaintiff, as a witness, or as a defendant in a lawsuit 
[23] involving or seeking personal damages in a civil dispute or 
[24] lawsuit. Do you remember that questioning? 
f9R1 A MUU..U/-XC ^ . - i 
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[ 1] Q. And my recollection is you did not respond. 
[ 2] A. Well, you know, everyone was jumping up around me, 
[ 3 ] you know. And I - my brain doesn't work as quickly as these 
[ 4] young people. There was too much energy in the room, and I 
[ 5] wasn't really -- I guess I wasn't as aggressive enough. 
[ 6 ] Q. Okay, but my recollection is that during voir dire 
[ 7] you didn't indicate that you'd been involved in any of those 
[ 8] situations? 
[ 9] A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[10] Q. There's been some suggestion since that that in fact 
[11] you have been involved as a plaintiff, or as a witness, or 
[12] defendant in some kind of a lawsuit? 
[13] A. Well, in business we were ~ we had a lawsuit lodged 
[14] against us. And it was one of our salesmen, so we were 
[15] involved in that 
[16] CL So help me understand the exact circumstances. You 
[17] said "we" were in business? 
[18] A. My husband and I. It was our business. It was our 
[19] corporation in California. 
[20] Q. So it was a corporation that you and your husband 
[21] operated? 
[22] A. Yes. 
[23] Q. Was it a closed corporation where the two of you 
[24] owned all the stock? 
[25] A. Right. 
Page 7 
[ I ] Q. What kind of a business was it? 
[ 2 ] A It was a precision manufacturing company. 
[ 3 ] Q. So you would take orders from customers, make parts. 
[ 4] and send them out? 
[ 5] A Right, uh-huh. 
[ 6] Q. Was it the kind of business where you would have 
[ 7] customers walk in off the street? 
[ 8 ] A. We were vendors. We were vendors. 
[ 9] Q. And tell me if you can what the nature was of the 
[10] lawsuits that were involved. 
[ I I ] A It was a salesman. He became disenchanted, and he 
[12] sued us for monies that he claimed that we had not paid him. 
[13] Q. So it was a contract dispute with one of your 
[14] employees or one of your associates? 
[15] A Right 
[16] Q. And was that suit resolved? 
[17] A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[18] Q. Was it resolved to your satisfaction? 
[19] A Yes. 
[20] Q. Was there anything about that circumstance or that 
[21] lawsuit that left you with a negative feeling toward the 
[22] courts or the method of resolution of disputes before the 
[23] court? 
rage o 
[ 1 ] other places than our place of employment 
[ 2] Q. Okay Well, let's talk about those in a moment 
[ 3] First of all, let's talk about the suit with the 
[ 4] employee Was this a Workman s Comp suit? 
[ 5] A Well, he wasn't our employee He was an independent 
[ 6] contractor He was a salesman 
[ 7] Q. But was that a Workman s Compensation suit? 
[ 8 ] A No 
[ 9 ] a So that was different? 
[10] A That was different 
[11] Q. Just speaking about that case, did that case leave 
[12] you with any feelings? 
[13] A No I just thought he was a disgruntled salesman 
[14] and he was trying to make some easy money We paid it and 
[15] that was it 
[16] Q. Okay Now you tell me there were some other claims? 
[17] A Yes Workman s Comp happened all the time with 
[18] employees that incurred injunes outside of our factory, and 
[19] then we had to pay for it 
[20] Q. So maybe when they weren't working or something like 
[21] that? 
[22] A Uh-huh (affirmative) 
[23] Q. Then theyd make a Workman s Comp claim? 
[24] A Right, and Workman's Comp paid for it 
[25] Q. Was that handled through the courts? Or was that 
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[ 1 ] handled through a process before you got to court? Or both? 
[ 2 ] A Well, it never even got to court because the lawyers 
[ 3] in California, they said it would cost more to go to court 
[ 4] than to settle out of court And so we settled out of court 
[ 5] and we wound up paying everything 
[ 6 ] CL Did that leave you with a negative feeling toward 
[ 7] the court system? 
[ 8] A Well, it taught me a good lesson in life It taught 
[ 9 ] me about people And it's really not a negative feeling, not 
[10] a disgruntled feeling about people, just that I m very leery 
[11] of people I can feel when a sham is being presented to me 
[12] and I can discern 
[13] Q. Now, the question I would have asked you at the time 
[14] had you given these answers to me at the time would have 
[15] been Having had those experiences and those circumstances 
[16] in California, can you or would you judge this case based on 
[17] its own facts, and on the law and circumstances as presented 
[18] in this case? 
[19] A I would have qualified myself, definitely, because 
[20] I ve had that happen to me throughout the years It s 
[21 ] happened many times, you know being an employer 
[22] CL Would you have been able -- well, let me ask you, 
[23] (inaudible) I m being very careful and circumspect because 
[24] there are very careful rules of law protecting the 
r o d - a — _ j -i . . 
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[ 1] And it is not my intent at this point to inquire into what 
[ 2] went on in the jury room except in certain areas 
[ 3] Did you consider this case on its own merits? Or did you 
[ 4] consider what happened to you in California? 
[ 5 ] A No I looked at this man My feelings about him 
[ 6] were this was a 16-year-old boy that got injured in the knee, 
[ 7] and for 10 years he was bilking the Ralph s grocery company 
[ 8 ] He comes here and he has a fender bender And he s 
[ 9] accustomed to receiving easy money and he wants to do the 
[10] same thing again He had lawsuits here, in Idaho, and he was 
[11] going back to California with one And so I looked at him 
[12] and I thought this is a young man that likes to bilk the 
[13] system 
[14] Q. Now, another issue that I want to ask you about, 
[15] there s been representation that - as I recall this trial 
[16] began on a Tuesday of the week? 
[17] A Uh-huh (affirmative) 
[18] Q. And we werent able to conclude that week, and it 
[19] went into the weekend And you folks came back I think on a 
[20] Tuesday and you concluded the case There was some - I gave 
[21] an instruction to the jurors that they should not discuss the 
[22] case amongst themselves or with anyone else until 
[23] deliberations had been concluded 
[24] A Uh-huh (affirmative) 
[25] Q. Did you follow that instruction? 
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[ 1 ] A Definitely, all of us 
[ 2] CL Did you have any discussion of this case with either 
[ 3] your husband or your daughter, who you and I both know is a 
[ 4] police officer? 
[ 5 ] A She was out of town She was out of town 
[ 6] Q. And you did not have a discussion with your husband 
[ 7] about this case until deliberations were over? 
[ 8] A Right 
[ 9] THE COURT Okay 
[10] All nght. Counsel, do you have other matters you 
[11] wish me to follow up on? 
[12] MR FLICKINGER Yes 
[13] THE COURT Why dont you approach 
[14] (Side-bar discussion with the Court & both counsel) 
[15] Q (BY THE COURT) The question is when you made the 
[16] comment a few moments ago that you would have qualified 
[17] yourself, I think my question was -- at that time what I 
[18] would have said was can you set aside whatever expenences 
[19] you have had in California as an employer and these Workman 
[20] Compensation suits and the suit with the disgruntled 
[21 ] salesperson, set that entire experience aside and judge this 
[22] case based on its own facts and its own merits? 
[23] A Definitely 
[24] MR FLICKINGER Your Honor, one more question 
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[ 1] to ask? 
[ 2] MR FLICKINGER The affidavit that we introduced 
[ 3] suggested some senous concerns about giving awards for 
[ 4] general damages And no questions have been asked about 
[ 5] that 
[ 6] MS MORGAN It actually goes beyond your position 
[ 7] THE COURT It does 
[ 8] Thank you so much I appreciate you coming in I 
[ 9] appreciate your help And you are excused, and I thank you 
[10] for your service 
[11] THE WITNESS And have a wonderful holiday 
[12] THE COURT You. too 
[13] What I'm going to allow you to do now, Counsel, if 
[14] you want to make your record with regard to your objections 
[15] and your statements, then I'll go ahead and hear argument 
[16] right now if you re ready to make it 
[17] MR FLICKINGER Judge, quite frankly I don t 
[18] believe the questions that should have been asked would have 
[19] been asked dunng the panel of the jury I would like to 
[20] have known much more regarding her feelings on Workman s 
[21] Compensation claims Her having disclosed that obviously 
[22] would have raised a large red flag, since Steven West had had 
[23] pnor Workman Compensation claims 
[24] It's clear she had strong feelings there She felt 
[25] that people were being injured off-site and then claiming 
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[ 1 ] they were injured on-site And that shows a very definite 
[ 2] bias So I think more questions would have been warranted 
[ 3] That leaves us with a lot of questions of what was there 
[ 4] The questions that we proposed in our proposed voir 
[ 5] dire I guess would be in the record, but I do believe it 
[ 6] would have been appropriate to inquire more about what she 
[ 7] brought into the deliberations that were not (inaudible) from 
[ 8] her pnor experience Also, the affidavit of Stacie Bersie 
[ 9 ] Ms Bersie made it clear that she did bnng extraneous 
[10] information 
[11] And again, I believe that the information regarding 
[12] her biases that she did not disclose dunng or here on 
[13] awarding general damages should have been inquired about 
[14] Thats a very key issue and very important 
[15] We do not believe that she honestly answered dunng 
[16] voir dire We have an affidavit that makes issue of that 
[17] Without it being inquired into, I dont think the Court could 
[18] make a decision in that regard 
[19] As far as augmentation, if youd like me to address 
[20] that now 
[21] THE COURT If you wish 
[22] MR FLICKINGER It s clear and the Court concedes 
[23] in its decision that she had very strong biases and opinions 
[24] from the get-go I don t believe it s disputed At the very 
r o c i i 
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[ 1] THE COURT I conceded in my opinion? 
[ 2] MR FLICKINGER In your memorandum decision you 
[ 3] stated in the last section that she had very clear - or very 
[ 4] strong opinions from the get-go with respect to whether or 
[ 5] not any discussions outside the courtroom -
[ 6] THE COURT Counsel, I dont know (inaudible) she 
[ 7] had I can represent that that has been represented to the 
[ 8] Court and I think probably confirmed by her testimony here 
[ 9] today 
[10] MR FLICKINGER We would submit to the Court that 
[11] her strong biases with respect to people who make Worker s 
[12] Compensation claims would place grounds for cause for this 
[13] juror She feels that all these claims that she had had 
[14] against her as an employer by her employees on Workers Comp 
[15] happened off grounds, but then people made claims that it 
[16] happened at work Then the Workers Comp claims, she wanted 
[17] to fight them but the system was too expensive 
[18] There was strong biases there that warranted causa, 
[19] or at the very least the nght of the Plaintiffs to exercise 
[20] a preemptory challenge 
[21] She concedes that she did not disclose these suits 
[22] or claims made against her She concedes that she should 
[23] have been more forthnght with the Court And again, I would 
[24] recommend to the Court the case of State v Evans where the 
[25] disclosure does not need to be intentional Or more 
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[ 1 ] importantly, where there is a juror who is biased and that 
[ 2] juror remains on the panel, remains there and has the bias, 
[ 3] that is grounds for a new tnal 
[ 4] We submit either for cause or that we were not 
[ 5] permitted the nght to use our peremptory challenge 
[ 6] Judge, at some point we're sitting there going at 
[ 7] sixes I don't know who to stnke We had peremptones that 
[ 8] we would most definitely would have liked to use for someone 
[ 9] who had strong opinions and biases regarding Worker s Comp 
[10] claims 
[11] We should be granted the nght for a new tnal so we 
[12] can have a fair, impartial jury panel 
[13] THE COURT Okay, thank you. Counsel 
[14] Ms Morgan? 
[15] MS MORGAN Yes, just a few points 
[16] McDonough requires that she had failed to answer 
[17] honestly and that this would have been justification for 
[18] dismissing her for cause 
[19] In this case we cant say that she had failed to 
[20] answer honestly The employee that brought the claim against 
[21 ] her was against her company for wages as an independent 
[22] contractor against a company The Worker s Comp claims are 
[23] situations where an employer is involved in the specifics of 
[24] these claims They end up getting handled by the -
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| [ 1 ] that she wasn t quick enough on the trigger, and had 
[ 2] information that she would have responded to that question 
[ 3 ] anddidnt? 
[ 4] MS MORGAN Yes But it s hard to go back and 
[ 5] recreate everything and take it out of context, because you 
[ 6] really were fairly pointed with who the question was directed 
[ 7] to Them, their mom, dad, brother or sister, close family 
[ 8] member I don t know that she would have considered these 
[ 9] claims to have been against her personally 
[10] THE COURT Well, I didnt state it differently here 
j [ 11 ] today, and she did She understood -
j [12] MS MORGAN But we had been going through you 
| [13] know, several minutes going through this same line of 
I [14] questioning And this was just a blast out of the air for 
[15] her But even still, even if she had gotten up and talked 
[16] about these things we cant say she would have been dismissed 
[17] for cause Counsel may recall - or the Court may recall 
[18] that she had a mother who had a serious injury and had been 
[19] diagnosed with cnps (sic) 
| [20] THE COURT Isnt that the real area of law that is 
[21 ] still somewhat confusing in Utah because of the plurality of 
[22] the decision on whether or not the Evans case that Counsel 
[23] cites, whether or not the two-prong test requires first that 
[24] there be something that was left out, or misleading, or 
[25] falsely responded to voir dire? 
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[ 1] pretty high standard to go back and say, you know, we think 
[ 2] maybe in this case that they could have gone the other way or 
[ 3] whatever I think it s got to be a fairly strict standard to 
[ 4] say that yes, they would have been taken out for cause 
[ 5] Anyway, I guess that's it 
[ 6] THE COURT All right, thank you Anything further? 
[ 7] MR FLICKINGER Judge, no I ve stated it 
[ 8] THE COURT Well, let me do it in reverse order 
[ 9] First of all, with regard to the questions about 
[10] deliberation She unequivocally answered that her daughter 
[11] was out of town and she did not discuss it with her husband 
[12] prior to deliberation I think I need to go no further than 
[13] that That objection to the verdict is denied 
[14] I want to make this record as clear as I can 
[15] because I m certain that it will be considered by the 
[16] appellate courts And, frankly, I think it needs to be The 
[17] plurality of the decision has left - in my view - me with 
[18] unclear precedent to follow And the clear precedent is the 
[19] supreme court case, the United States Supreme Court case, 
[20] which describes a two-prong test for challenging a jury 
[21] verdict 
[22] As I understand the two prongs the first prong is 
[23] that there was a falsehood or a misstatement of fact made by 
[24] a juror during voir dire And in this case I find that there 
[25] was 
Page 17 
[ 1 ] Second, the Supreme Court says that the (inaudible) 
[ 2] must have created an excuse for cause What s the Utah law 
[ 3] on that point? I mean. Justice Stewart - was it Justice 
[ 4] Stewart? It gets confusing when we consider the plurality 
[ 5] But there were some of the justices that seemed to think that 
[ 6 ] if the first prong was satisfied the second prong was 
[ 7] automatically satisfied They didnt really analyze whether 
j [ 8] or not the omission in that -- I think it was the Thompson 
[ 9 ] case - whether that omission would have given nse to a 
[10] challenge for cause 
I [11] MS MORGAN I think you do have to analyze it, 
[12] otherwise there would just be one prong 
[13] THE COURT Well, what s your view on what the Utah 
[14] law is? Is it enough that it would have made a stronger case 
[15] or a stronger reason for him to exercise a preemptory? Or 
[16] must it nse to the point that I would necessanly have 
[17] sustained a challenge for cause? 
[18] MS MORGAN I think its the latter I think its 
[19] got to be a fairly high standard, because courts tend to want 
[20] to leave sacrosanct what the jury has done and not go back 
[21] and second-guess junes I mean otherwise it would be an 
[22] easier burden and we d be having junes overturned time and 
[23] time again 
[24] I think that the spirit of the law of McDonough and 
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1 Very clearly, very plainly I asked if they or a 
close family member had been involved as a plaintiff, 
witness, or defendant in a civil lawsuit Even if I were to 
interpret that question very narrowly and say it was a 
corporation they were involved in so it wasn t her 
personally, she and her husband were the only owners They 
certainly would have been involved as witnesses And I think 
any reasonable person hearing that questioning would have 
assumed the scope that she assumed today in response to my 
questioning Plainly, she failed to answer and she omitted 
that important information 
The second prong, however, I m going to find that 
the law is that the omission must have created or supplied a 
basis for a challenge as to cause Her testimony this 
morning - and it s very difficult to go backwards and it s 
hard to turn the clock back I mean it s a very awkward 
kind of questioning to say, well would you have disregarded 
that had you been asked to? That s hard to do and I 
recognize that 
But I think her answer this morning was candid and 
forthnght She has strong feelings She felt that she had 
been taken advantage of as a business owner by the Workman s 
Compensation process in California That was a situation 
that factually and directly related to this case without 
r o n J 
[ 1 ] Her conclusion of the evidence in this case was that 
[ 2 ] this young man, this plaintiff had been earlier injured in a 
[ 3] Workman's Compensation accident. I think that his treatment 
[ 4] was in fact described during the trial as a "golden ticket." 
[ 5] That he had a way to pay for all of the medical expenses 
[ 6] related to that Workman's Compensation injury for - I got 
[ 7 ] the impression for forever. So long as the employee 
[ 8] treatment was related to the Workman's Compensation injury, 
[ 9 ] he had a way to pay for it. 
[10] She clearly found that that was repugnant; she 
[11] didn't like that. And she felt that that was a defect and a 
[12] problem with the system. However, her statement was that she 
[13] felt she would have qualified herself as a juror. When I 
[14] asked about that again -- and I think that the impact of what 
[15] she said before was that she would have done as instructed 
[16] and set aside her experiences from the earlier circumstances. 
[17] I didn't say that very well. She would have set aside her 
[18] experiences and judged this case on its own merit. I do not 
[19] feel that I would have sustained a challenge as to cause. 
[20] Plainly, this is a circumstance where she would have 
[21] been an early preemptory challenge. So what I'm leaving on 
[22] the record is I'm finding that Counsel would have had a 
[23] strong basis and reason to exercise a preemptory challenge, 
[24] but that the evidence and the response would not have risen 
[25] to a challenge for cause. And because of that I'm going to 
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[ 1] find that the prongs were not satisfied and deny the motion 
[ 2] for a new trial. 
[ 3 ] I hope I've made the record clear so if they rule on 
[ 4] appeal they would rule on that narrow issue. And if I'm 
[ 5] wrong. I'm wrong, but I think that's the status of the 
[ 6] record. I don't know how I can get any better than that. 
[ 7] Let's get some law on it. If the Court of Appeals tells me 
[ 8 ] to go the other way, then I will. 
[ 9] Thank you very much. 
[10] Ms. Morgan, will you prepare an appropriate order? 
[11] MS. MORGAN: I will. 
[12] MR FLICKINGER: Thank you. Judge. 
[13] MS. MORGAN: Thank you. 
[14] THE COURT: Thank you. 
[15] (End of proceedings.) 
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ADDENDUM NO. 4 
1 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection. 
(1) (a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy which 
includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general damages 
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident, except 
where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(i) death; 
(ii) dismemberment; 
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply to a person making an uninsured motorist claim. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may only 
exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor vehicle owned by 
or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of the insured and not 
insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle without 
the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured 
motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while 
located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or 
revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be contained in 
other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of an accident 
covered in this code under any workers1 compensation or similar statutory plan; and 
© 2002 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement 
2 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from the United States or 
any of its agencies because that person is on active duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, including those 
policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the motor 
vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a 
monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer 
receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof 
is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of 
the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid 
within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the 
rate of 1 1/2% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses 
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits 
and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under personal injury protection have 
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund created under Chapter 
33, the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer 
for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by 
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; 1988 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, § 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1; 2000, ch. 222, § 
5; 2001, ch. 59, § 3. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 5 
1 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by 
a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority 
to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or 
in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by 
the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or 
capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative 
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subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, ch. 
248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127, § 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5; 1995, ch. 
299, § 46; 1996, ch. 159, § 18; 2001, ch. 302, § 1. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 6 
1 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against 
law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision 
(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after 
such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court 
may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own 
initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 59, F.R.C.P. 
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